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Introduction
The first cases of the current West African epidemic of Ebola 
virus disease (hereafter referred to as Ebola) were reported on 
March 22, 2014, with a report of 49 cases in Guinea (1).*,† 
By August 31, 2014, the World Health Organization had 
reported 3,685 probable, confirmed, and suspected cases in 
West Africa, with 2,914 in Sierra Leone and Liberia and 771 
in Guinea (2). To aid in planning for additional disease-control 
efforts, a modeling tool called EbolaResponse was constructed 
to provide estimates of the potential number of future cases.
Methods
CDC constructed the EbolaResponse modeling tool in 
a spreadsheet (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15620/
cdc.24900) using Microsoft Excel 2010 and used the model 
to estimate the increase in Ebola cases in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone (see Appendix for additional results and technical notes). 
Similar to previous Ebola models (3,4), EbolaResponse tracks 
patients through the following states of Ebola-related infection 
and disease: susceptible to disease, infected, incubating, 
infectious, and recovered. The infectious state also includes 
persons who die but whose burial provides risk for onward 
transmission. The risk associated with unsafe burial is part of 
the total daily risk for transmission for the patients at home 
without effective isolation (Appendix [Table 1]). All infected 
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Abstract
The first cases of the current West African epidemic of Ebola virus disease (hereafter referred to as Ebola) were reported on 
March 22, 2014, with a report of 49 cases in Guinea. By August 31, 2014, a total of 3,685 probable, confirmed, and suspected 
cases in West Africa had been reported. To aid in planning for additional disease-control efforts, CDC constructed a modeling tool 
called EbolaResponse to provide estimates of the potential number of future cases. If trends continue without scale-up of effective 
interventions, by September 30, 2014, Sierra Leone and Liberia will have a total of approximately 8,000 Ebola cases. A potential 
underreporting correction factor of 2.5 also was calculated. Using this correction factor, the model estimates that approximately 
21,000 total cases will have occurred in Liberia and Sierra Leone by September 30, 2014. Reported cases in Liberia are doubling 
every 15–20 days, and those in Sierra Leone are doubling every 30–40 days. The EbolaResponse modeling tool also was used to 
estimate how control and prevention interventions can slow and eventually stop the epidemic. In a hypothetical scenario, the 
epidemic begins to decrease and eventually end if approximately 70% of persons with Ebola are in medical care facilities or Ebola 
treatment units (ETUs) or, when these settings are at capacity, in a non-ETU setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission (including safe burial when needed). In another hypothetical scenario, every 30-day delay in increasing the percentage 
of patients in ETUs to 70% was associated with an approximate tripling in the number of daily cases that occur at the peak of 
the epidemic (however, the epidemic still eventually ends). Officials have developed a plan to rapidly increase ETU capacities 
and also are developing innovative methods that can be quickly scaled up to isolate patients in non-ETU settings in a way that 
can help disrupt Ebola transmission in communities. The U.S. government and international organizations recently announced 
commitments to support these measures. As these measures are rapidly implemented and sustained, the higher projections presented 
in this report become very unlikely.
* The latest updates, including case counts, on the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa are available at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/guinea/index.html. 
† The most up-to-date clinical guidelines on the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa are available at http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/index.html.
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persons were assumed to eventually become symptomatic. 
Data from reports of previous Ebola outbreaks were used to 
model the daily change of patients’ status between the disease 
states. For example, a probability distribution to characterize 
the likelihood of incubating a given number of days was built 
using previously published data (4). The resulting distribution 
has a mean incubation period of approximately 6 days and a 
99th percentile of 21 days (Appendix [Figure 4]). Based on 
previous studies, patients were assumed to be infectious for a 
period of 6 days (3,5). 
Patients were categorized into three levels: 1) hospitalized 
in an Ebola treatment unit (ETU) or medical care facility, 
2) home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced 
risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when 
needed), and 3) home with no effective isolation (Appendix 
[Figure 5]). Hospitalized refers to facilities such as ETUs where 
medical care is provided. Ideally, such facilities have infection-
control protocols that prevent additional disease transmission. 
However, this is not always the case. Therefore, the average 
daily risk for transmission is greater than zero in these facilities 
(i.e., transmission does occur), but the risk is fewer than one 
person infected per infectious patient (Appendix [Table 1]).
The risk for onward disease transmission by patient category 
was calculated (Appendix [Table 1]). The ability to add 
imported cases (whole numbers) every 10 days (approximately 
the sum of the average incubation and infectiousness periods) 
was built into the EbolaResponse modeling tool (Appendix 
[Table 2]). Imported cases represent either cases in persons who 
travel into the community undetected from other outbreak-
affected areas or persons who might represent previously 
undetected chains of transmission. To estimate the daily 
number of beds in use (i.e., beds in medical care facilities, such 
as ETUs), previously published data were adapted to provide 
both the likelihood of a patient going to an ETU and the 
number of days that a patient in each patient category would 
spend in the hospital (6) (Appendix [Table 3]). 
Substantial underreporting of cases might be occurring both 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone (7). To correct for underreporting, 
EbolaResponse was used to predict the number of beds in use 
on August 28, 2014. This number was then compared with the 
actual number of beds in use (from expert opinion estimates). 
The difference between the two estimates is the potential 
underreporting correction factor of 2.5 (Appendix [Table 4]). 
Accuracy of the estimates produced by EbolaResponse was 
assessed by comparing the model-predicted number of cases 
to the reported cases (Appendix [Figure 6, Table 5]). The 
difference in estimates calculated using the uncorrected data 
and the estimates using the data corrected for underreporting 
reflects the potential range of uncertainty regarding the actual 
number of cases that might occur.
Accuracy of the model forecasts was tested by comparing the 
latest available reported cases at time of writing to estimated 
cases (estimated using uncorrected data). The last date of 
reported data used to fit the model was August 28, 2014, for 
Sierra Leone and August 29, 2014, for Liberia.  Reported cases 
were compared with estimated cases as of September 9, 2014, 
for Liberia and September 13, 2014, for Sierra Leone. 
In the absence of a universal preventive intervention (e.g., 
vaccine), control of the epidemic consists of having as many 
patients as possible receiving care in hospitals or, when ETUs 
are at capacity, at home or in a community setting such that 
there is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe 
burial when needed). Suitable methods to enhance protection 
and minimize disease transmission are under development. To 
illustrate how increasing the percentage of patients in these 
two categories can control and eventually end the epidemic in 
Liberia, the first scenario was created. Starting on August 24, 
2014, and for the following 30 days, the percentage of patients 
in ETUs was increased from 10% of all patients to 17%. In 
the subsequent 30 days (starting September 23, 2014), that 
percentage was increased to 25% and left at that level for the 
remainder of the period covered by the model (Appendix 
[Figure 7, Figure 8]). Starting on August 24, 2014, and for the 
following 30 days, the percentage of patients at home or in a 
community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission was increased from 8% of all patients to 20%. 
Additional increases were included so that by December 22, 
2014, a total of 70% of patients were in either one of the 
two patient settings (25% in ETUs and 45% at home or in a 
community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission) (Appendix [Figure 8]).
To illustrate the cost of delay, in terms of additional cases and 
the resulting need for additional resources to end the epidemic, in 
starting to increase interventions that can control and eventually 
stop the epidemic, a second separate control-and-stop scenario 
was first constructed as follows. Starting on September 23, 2014, 
and for the next 30 days, the percentage of all patients in ETUs 
was increased from 10% to 13%. This percentage was again 
increased on October 23, 2014, to 25%, on November 22, 2014, 
to 40%, and finally on December 22, 2014, to 70% (Appendix 
[Figure 9]) (i.e., it takes 90 days for the percentage of patients in 
ETUs to reach 70% of all patients). The percentage of patients 
at home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced 
risk for disease transmission was kept at 8% from September 23, 
2014, through the remainder of the period covered by the model. 
The impact of delay of starting the increase in interventions was 
then estimated by twice repeating the above scenario but setting 
the start day on either October 23, 2014, or November 22, 2014.
MMWR / September 26, 2014 / Vol. 63 / No. 3 3
Supplement
Results
If trends continue without additional interventions, the 
model estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will have 
approximately 8,000 total Ebola cases (21,000 total cases 
when corrected for underreporting) by September 30, 2014 
(Figure 1). Liberia will account for approximately 6,000 cases 
(16,000 corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 
1]). Total cases in the two countries combined are doubling 
approximately every 20 days (Figure 1). Cases in Liberia are 
doubling every 15–20 days, and those in Sierra Leone are 
doubling every 30–40 days (Appendix [Figure 1]).
By September 30, 2014, without additional interventions 
and using the described likelihood of going to an ETU, 
approximately 670 daily beds in use (1,700 corrected for 
underreporting) will be needed in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Figure 2). Extrapolating trends to January 20, 2015, 
without additional interventions or changes in community 
behavior (e.g., notable reductions in unsafe burial practices), 
the model also estimates that Liberia and Sierra Leone will 
have approximately 550,000 Ebola cases (1.4 million when 
corrected for underreporting) (Appendix [Figure 2]). The 
uncorrected estimates of cases for Liberia on September 9, 
2014, were 2,618, and the actual reported cases were 2,407 
(i.e., model overestimated cases by +8.8%). The uncorrected 
estimates of cases for Sierra Leone on September 13, 2014, were 
1,505 and the actual reported cases were 1,620 (i.e., model 
underestimated cases by -7.6%).
Results from the two illustrative scenarios provide an example 
of how the epidemic can be controlled and eventually stopped. 
If, by late December 2014,  approximately 70% of patients 
were placed either in ETUs or home or in a community 
setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission 
(including safe burial when needed), then the epidemic in 
both countries would almost be ended by January 20, 2015 
(Appendix [Figure 3]). In the first scenario, once 70% of 
patients are effectively isolated, the outbreak decreases at a 
rate nearly equal to the initial rate of increase. In the second 
scenario, starting an intervention on September 23, 2014, such 
that initially the percentage of all patients in ETUs are increased 
from 10% to 13% and thereafter including continual increases 
until 70% of all patients are in an ETU by December 22, 2014, 
results in a peak of 1,335 daily cases (3,408 cases estimated 
using corrected data) and <300 daily cases by January 20, 2015 
(Appendix [Figure 10]).  Delaying the start of the intervention 
until October 23, 2014, results in the peak increasing to 
4,178 daily cases (10,646 cases estimated using corrected 
data).  Delaying the start further, until November 22, results 
in 10,184 daily cases (25,847 estimated using corrected data) 
by January 20, 2015, which is the last date included in the 
model (Appendix [Figure 10]).
Discussion
The cumulative number of Ebola cases for Liberia and Sierra 
Leone could double to approximately 8,000 by the end of 
September 2014. This estimate is within the range of other 
published estimates (8,9). Cases could be underreported by a 
factor of 2.5, and ending the epidemic requires approximately 
70% of persons with Ebola to be treated either in an ETU or at 
home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk 
for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed). 
A substantial cost can be associated with delaying the start of 
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FIGURE 1. Estimated number of Ebola cases, with and without 
correction for underreporting,* through September 30 — 
EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
combined, 2014
* Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a 
factor of 2.5 (Appendix [Table 4]).
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FIGURE 2. Estimated daily number of beds in use,* with and 
without correction for underreporting,† through September 30 
— EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
combined, 2014
* Estimates of daily number of beds in use are calculated using estimates of 
likelihood of going to an Ebola treatment center (ETU) and days in the ETU 
(Appendix [Table 3]).
† Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a 
factor of 2.5 (Appendix [Table 4]).
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an increase in effective interventions. In the relevant scenario 
examined in this report, every 30-day delay in increasing the 
percentage of patients in ETUs until 70% of all patients were 
hospitalized was associated with an approximate tripling of the 
number of daily cases that occur at the peak of the epidemic 
(however, the epidemic still eventually ends).
Limitations
The findings in this report are subject to at least five 
limitations. First, extrapolating current trends in increase of 
cases to forecast all future cases might not be appropriate. 
Underlying factors such as a spontaneous change in contacts 
with ill persons or burial practices or substantial changes 
in movement within countries or across borders could alter 
future growth patterns. Therefore, limiting model-calculated 
projections to shorter durations such as 3 months might 
be more appropriate. Second, assuming that this epidemic 
has similar epidemiologic parameters to previous outbreaks 
(e.g., incubation and infectiousness periods) might not be 
accurate, although anecdotal evidence to date has not indicated 
otherwise. Third, reliance on expert opinion to estimate a 
correction factor regarding number of beds in use might not 
account sufficiently for factors such as patients being turned 
away from full ETUs. Fourth, the correction factor could 
change substantially over time. Notable regional differences 
in underreporting might mean that using one correction 
factor across an entire country is inappropriate. Finally, the 
illustrative scenario does not consider the logistics needed to 
increase the percentages of patients who are receiving care in 
an ETU or at home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial 
when needed).
Conclusion
The findings in this report underscore the substantial 
public health challenges posed by the predicted number of 
future Ebola cases. If conditions continue without scale-up 
of interventions, cases will continue to double approximately 
every 20 days, and the number of cases in West Africa will 
rapidly reach extraordinary levels. However, the findings also 
indicate that the epidemic can be controlled. Ensuring that 
approximately 70% of the patients are in ETUs is necessary, 
or, when ETUs are at capacity, that they are at home or in a 
community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission (including safe burial when needed). The existing 
capacity of ETUs to admit patients with Ebola is insufficient to 
stem the estimated increases in cases. Delays in increasing ETU 
capacity translates into a cost of additional cases. Results of the 
model support the need for more ETUs to be built, supplied, 
and staffed. Officials have developed a plan to rapidly increase 
ETU capacities and also are developing innovative methods 
that can be quickly scaled up to isolate patients in non-ETU 
settings in a way that can help disrupt Ebola transmission 
in communities.  The U.S. government and international 
organizations recently announced commitments to support 
these measures. As these measures are rapidly implemented 
and sustained, the higher projections presented in this report 
become very unlikely.
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Appendix
Additional Results and Technical Notes for the EbolaResponse Modeling Tool
Additional Results
Numbers of Ebola virus disease cases (hereafter referred 
to as Ebola) and daily number of beds in use in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone alone (Figure 1) and in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
combined (Figure 2) were estimated using the EbolaResponse 
modeling tool. The outcome of potential interventions on 
number of cases and beds in use in the two countries combined 
was simulated (Figure 3).
EbolaResponse Model Overview
CDC has created a spreadsheet-based modeling tool called 
EbolaResponse that allows users to estimate the number 
of Ebola cases in a community (available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.15620/cdc.24900). The model tracks patients 
through the following states: susceptible, infected, incubating, 
infectious, and recovered (an SIIR model). EbolaResponse is, 
in effect, a Markov chain model and is similar to an Ebola 
model built in 2004 (1).
Probabilities drawn from reports of previous Ebola outbreaks 
are used to model the daily change in patients’ status between 
and within the SIIR states. For example, to estimate the 
duration of the incubating state, data were adapted from 
a previous study (2) that indicate the likelihood that an 
incubation period will last a certain number of days, up to a 
maximum of 25. A patient can only progress forward through 
the states and can never regress (e.g., go from the incubating 
state back to susceptible) or skip a state (e.g., go from the 
incubating to the recovered state, skipping the infectious 
state). All infected persons were assumed to eventually become 
symptomatic. That is, the state of being infected but not 
becoming symptomatic at any period was not considered.
Assumed Population Size and 
Numbers Initially Infected
Community sizes equal to the populations of either Liberia 
or Sierra Leone were assumed and used. The community 
size can be readily altered. Numbers used in the model as 
initially infected were chosen to match the number of cases 
first recorded (2).
Liberia
•	 Population: 4,294,000 (3)
•	 Initially infected: Nine
Sierra Leone
•	 Population: 6,092,000 (3)
•	 Initially infected: 30
Incubation State
Data from two sources (2,4) were used to construct a 
lognormal probability distribution of being in the incubation 
state (Figure 4, Table 1). The mean incubation period derived 
from this calculation is 6.3 days (standard deviation [SD]: 3.31 
days), with a median of 5.5 days and a 99th percentile at 21 days. 
In one study, data from a 1995 outbreak in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) and a 2000 
outbreak in Uganda were used to estimate mean incubation 
periods of 5.30 days (SD: 0.23 days) and 3.35 days 
(SD: 0.49 days), respectively (1). These are lower than other 
published estimates (2,4). Some of the differences might be 
attributable to different subtypes of the virus (4).
The incubation distribution can be changed, with an upper 
limit of 25 days of incubation. Users of the EbolaResponse 
modeling tool can change the incubation distribution by 
selecting from two alternative, preprogrammed distributions 
available from the drop-down menu in the appropriate page 
in EbolaResponse.  The two alternative distributions were 
based on previously published studies (2,4). As yet another 
alternative, users can enter their own distribution.
Infectious State
Average Number of Days
An average infectious state of 6 days was assumed in the 
model, which includes any time taken for a traditional burial. 
In comparison, data from a 1995 outbreak in DRC and a 2000 
outbreak in Uganda (the latter caused by the Sudan strain of 
Ebola) (5) were used to calculate estimated mean infectious 
periods of 5.6 and 3.50 days, respectively (1). Data from the 
1995 Ebola outbreak in the Congo also were used to calculate 
6 MMWR / September 26, 2014 / Vol. 63 / No. 3
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an estimated mean infectious period of approximately 6 days 
(6). Repeated testing of patients with Ebola has demonstrated 
that the amount of virus present increases until death or 
approximately 6–10 days after initial infection (7). The 
EbolaResponse modeling tool can be used to adjust this period 
from 1 day to a maximum of 15 days.
The risk for onward transmission of infection to a person in 
the susceptible state was assumed to be equal throughout the 
6 days. No data were found regarding whether risk for onward 
transmission changes over the duration of fulminant illness. 
However, the possibility exists that the risk does change as a 
patient becomes more ill and requires more care.
Burial Practices
Traditional burial of the body of a person who has died from 
Ebola could involve contact with body fluids, posing a risk 
for infection. For example, in northern Uganda, the body is 
prepared for burial by the paternal aunt (or if no paternal aunt 
exists, by an older woman on the paternal side of the family). 
After removing clothes from the body, the woman washes and 
dresses it. Funeral rituals include all family members washing 
their hands in a common bowl and touching the face of the 
deceased person in the open casket, referred to as a love touch. 
A white cloth is used to wrap the body, and the body is buried 
(8). Although this burial ritual is an example from Uganda, 
researchers have mentioned that similar practices occur 
throughout Africa (9).  Because cultural practices regarding 
burial might vary by region, users might want to change the 
period of infectiousness in the model.
FIGURE 1. Estimated number of Ebola cases and daily number of beds in use,* with and without correction for underreporting,† through September 30 
— EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014
* Estimates of daily number of beds in use are calculated using estimates of likelihood of going to an Ebola treatment unit (ETU) and days in the ETU (Table 3).
† Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a factor of 2.5 (Table 4).
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Population Governor
Although an exposed state is not included in the model, 
a population governor is included that prevents the model 
from calculating more cases than the input population. This 
overestimation is possible if a user of the model assumes that 
most of the patients remain home with no effective isolation, 
the patient category that has the highest risk for onward disease 
transmission (Table 1).
The governor was programmed by reducing the daily 
estimate of persons newly infected proportionate to the 
cumulative reduction in the susceptible population as follows:
FIGURE 2. Estimated number of Ebola cases and daily number of beds in use,* with and without correction for underreporting† — EbolaResponse 
modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra Leone combined, 2014–2015
* Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a factor of 2.5 (Table 4).
† Estimates of daily number of beds in use are calculated using estimates of likelihood of going to an Ebola treatment unit (ETU) and days in the ETU (Table 3).
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FIGURE 3. Estimated impact of intervention* on number of Ebola cases and daily number of beds in use,† with and without correction for 
underreporting§ — EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia, 2014–2015
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
3/26 4/25 5/25 6/24 7/24 8/23 9/22 10/22 11/21 12/21 1/20
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
no
. o
f c
as
es
 
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
Date
Uncorrected
Corrected
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
3/26 4/25 5/25 6/24 7/24 8/23 9/22 10/22 11/21 12/21 1/20
D
ai
ly
 n
o.
 o
f b
ed
s 
in
 u
se
 
(h
un
dr
ed
s)
Date
Uncorrected
Corrected
Cumulative number of cases Daily number of beds in use
* To construct an illustrative control scenario in Liberia, an intervention modeling scenario was created in which, starting on August 24, 2014, the percentage of 
patients in Ebola treatment units (ETUs) increased from 10% of all patients to 17%.  In the subsequent 30 days (starting September 21, 2014), that percentage was 
increased to 25% and left at that level for the remainder of the period covered by the model (Figure 8). Starting on August 24, 2014, the percentage of patients at 
home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed) was increased from 8% of all patients 
to 20%.  Additional increases were included so that by December 22, 2014, a total of 70% of patients were in either one of those two settings (25% in ETUs + 45% at 
home or in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission [including safe burial when needed]) (Figure 8).
† Estimates of daily number of beds in use are calculated using estimates of likelihood of going to an ETU and days in the ETU (Table 3).
§ Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a factor of 2.5 (Table 4).
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Factor to reduce estimate of newly infected at  
Day t = [Model population – Cumulative total of newly 
infected up to Day (t-1)] / Model population
This governor reduces, on a daily basis, the estimated 
number of persons infected, which effectively lowers the risk 
for transmission (Table 1). In most instances, this governor 
is unlikely to affect the calculations from large populations. 
The governor only begins to appreciably reduce estimates 
when approximately 40%–50% of the population has become 
infected. The EbolaResponse governor also is programmed so 
that the minimum value of the calculated factor cannot be less 
than 0, preventing the possibility of negative cases. 
Distribution Over Time of Patients by 
Patient Category
Patients were categorized by three types of patient. 
These three categories have different levels of isolation: 
1) hospitalized, 2) home or in a community setting such that 
there is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe 
burial when needed), and 3) home with no effective isolation.
•	 Hospitalized patients are in facilities such as Ebola 
treatment units (ETUs) where medical care is provided. 
Ideally, such facilities have infection-control protocols that 
prevent additional disease transmission. However, this is 
not always the case, and health-care workers in medical 
care facilities have been infected after contact with Ebola 
patients (10). Therefore, the average daily risk for 
transmission is greater than zero in these facilities (i.e., 
transmission occurs), but the risk is fewer than one person 
infected per infectious patient (Table 1).
•	 A patient who is at home or in a community setting such 
that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission 
(including safe burial when needed) is being attended to 
with the overall goal of  reducing transmission to other 
members of the household. If the patient dies, safe burial 
practices are used. Risk is fewer than one person infected 
per infectious patient (Table 1).
•	 A patient who is at home with no effective isolation is 
being attended to at home but with no specific infection-
control measures in place. In addition, if the patient dies, 
no measures are in place to limit transmission. This patient 
category has the greatest risk for onward transmission 
(Table 1).
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FIGURE 4. Distribution of Ebola virus incubation period, by days of 
incubation
Sources: Data adapted from Legrand J, Grais RF, Boelle PY, Valleron AJ, Flahault A. 
Understanding the dynamics of Ebola epidemics. Epidemiol Infect 2007;135:610–
21; and Eichner M, Dowell SF, Firese N. Incubation period of Ebola hemorrhagic 
virus subtype Zaire. Osong Public Health Res Perspect 2011;2:3–7.
* Frequency relates to number of patients out of a total of 5,000 patients.
TABLE 1. Calculated risk for onward transmission of Ebola, by patient category — EbolaResponse modeling tool, West Africa, 2014
Patient category
Daily risk for onward transmission
No. infected per  
infectious person 
(95% CI)§
Values used to fit to 
data for Liberia and 
Sierra Leone*
Values from literature†
From 
literature
Model 
estimatesDRC (95% CI) Uganda (95% CI)
Hospitalized 0.02 0.1134 (0.00001–0.5842) 0.0017 (0.0–0.918) 0.4 (0–2.2) 0.12
0.01 (0–3.5)
Home or in a community setting such 
that there is a reduced risk for 
disease transmission (including safe 
burial when needed)
0.03  0.084 (0.06–0.313) 0.5045 (0.0576–0.5391) 0.5 (0.4–1.9) 0.18
2.6 (0.3–2.8)
Home with no effective isolation 0.3 1.0932 (0.00001–1.4281) 0.066 (0.0–3.0367) 1.8 (0–2.3) 1.8
0.1 (0–3.2)
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo.
* Values used to obtain a good fit of cases estimated by the EbolaResponse model to the reported cumulative cases in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
† Values adapted from weekly values given by from Ebola outbreaks in 1995 in DRC (formerly Zaire) and in 2000 in Uganda. (Source: Legrand J, Grais RF, Boelle PY, 
Valleron AJ, Flahault A. Understanding the dynamics of Ebola epidemics. Epidemiol Infect 2007;135:610–21.)
§ When these values remain at fewer than one person infected per infectious person, the epidemic eventually ends. The EbolaResponse modeling tool uses the shown 
values to fit the model to the data, assuming 6 days of infectiousness (e.g., 0.3 x 6 = 1.8 people infected per infectious person).
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These three categories have varying risk for onward Ebola 
virus transmission over time (Figure 5). The estimated values 
were calculated by altering these values with the risk for onward 
transmission (Table 1) as well as the number of imported cases 
or cases in patients with no known contacts (Table 2). All of 
these values were altered until the estimates of cases produced 
by the model closely matched (i.e., fit) the reported cases to 
date (see also Goodness of Fit section).
The distribution of patients into the three patient categories 
influences the overall progress of the epidemic. For example, 
the more patients who are hospitalized and at home or in a 
community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission, the slower the progress of the epidemic because 
these two categories are calculated to have transmission rates 
of fewer than one person infected per infectious person 
(Table 1). A certain proportion of patients who were home or 
in a community setting such that there is a reduced risk for 
disease transmission and home with no effective isolation was 
assumed to eventually become hospitalized in ETUs (Table 3). 
However, they were assumed to be hospitalized so late in the 
progression of the disease that the average risk for onward 
transmission was unchanged.
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FIGURE 5. Proportion of patients* with Ebola over time, by category 
of patient† — EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, 2014
* Distribution estimated using the modeling tool, obtained after fitting the 
model output (cumulative number of cases) to actual data.
† Patients are distributed in the EbolaResponse modeling tool into one of three 
categories: 1) hospitalized, 2) home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed), 
and 3) home with no effective isolation. These three categories reflect the risk 
for onward Ebola transmission (Table 1). EbolaResponse is programmed to 
make changes in the distribution of patients among the three categories of 
care every 30 days. For Liberia, day 1 is March 3, 2014, and for Sierra Leone, is 
May 27, 2014. September 22, 2014, is day 180 when the model is fitted to 
Liberian data and is day 119 when the model is fitted to Sierra Leone data.
TABLE 2. Calculated number of arrivals of imported cases* of Ebola, 
by duration of epidemic — EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, 2014
Duration of 
epidemic (days)
Arrivals of imported cases (no.)
Liberia Sierra Leone
Model with 
uncorrected 
data
Model with 
corrected 
data†
Model with 
uncorrected 
data
Model with 
corrected 
data†
10 0 0 25 25
20 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0
60 0 0 0 0
70 10 3 0 0
80 10 4 0 0
90 7 4 0 0
100 7 4 0 0
110 6 4 0 0
120 15 20 0 0
130 10 22 0 0
140 15 20 0 0
150 0 0 0 0
160 0 0 0 0
170 0 0 0 0
180 0 0 0 0
190 0 0 0 0
200 0 0 0 0
210 0 0 0 0
220 0 0 0 0
230 0 0 0 0
240 0 0 0 0
250 0 0 0 0
260 0 0 0 0
270 0 0 0 0
280 0 0 0 0
290 0 0 0 0
300 0 0 0 0
* Imported cases represent 1) persons with Ebola who travel into the community 
undetected from another outbreak-affected area or 2) those whose infection 
cannot be readily explained by contact tracing (i.e., apparently no known 
contact with a previously ill patient).
† The impact of possible underreporting was examined, and the data from both 
countries were corrected by factor of 2.5. After the reported cases were 
multiplied by 2.5, the model was refitted to the corrected data, which in some 
instances required altering input values such as number of imported cases.
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Risk for Onward Transmission
The risk for onward transmission from an Ebola patient  in 
the infectious state to persons in the susceptible state varies by 
patient category (Table 1). The estimated values were calculated 
by altering these values along with the distribution of patients 
by category of patient (Figure 5) as well as the number of 
imported cases or cases in patients with no known contacts 
(Table 2). All of these values were altered until the estimates 
of cases produced by the model closely matched (i.e., fit) the 
reported cases to date (see also Goodness of Fit section).
Allowing for Imported Cases or Cases 
in Persons With No Known Contacts
The ability to add imported cases (whole numbers) every 
10 days was built into the EbolaResponse modeling tool. 
These persons are entered into the model as infected and then 
go through incubation before becoming infectious. Imported 
cases represent 1) Ebola cases in persons who travel into the 
community undetected from another outbreak-affected area or 
2) cases in persons whose infection cannot be readily explained 
by contact tracing (i.e., apparently no known contact with a 
previously ill patient). The values shown (Table 2) were used 
to calculate the  estimated cases presented in the main report.
The estimated number of imported cases per each 10-day 
time step were calculated by altering these numbers along with 
the distribution of patients by category of patient (Figure 5) as 
well as the risk for onward transmission (Table 1). All of these 
numbers were altered until the estimates of cases produced by 
the model closely matched (i.e., fit) the reported cases to date 
(see also Goodness of Fit section).
Likelihood of Being Hospitalized and 
Duration of Hospital Stay
To estimate daily hospital admissions and daily number of 
beds in use, both the likelihood of a patient being hospitalized 
and the number of days that a patient in each patient category 
would spend in the hospital had to be assumed (Table 3). 
Correcting for Potential 
Underreporting
Substantial underreporting of cases might be occurring 
both in Liberia and Sierra Leone (11). To adjust for such a 
possibility, the calculated daily number of hospital beds in use 
was compared with expert opinion of number of beds in use. 
A correction factor of approximately 2.5 was calculated for 
Liberia (Table 4). Therefore, to obtain an estimate of actual 
cases, the reported cases are multiplied by 2.5. After a corrected 
number of cases was calculated, the model was refitted (see 
Goodness of Fit section).
Goodness of Fit
The following three variables were altered so that the 
estimates from the model more closely matched (i.e., fit) the 
actual reported cases:
•	 Percentage of patients in each of the three patient 
categories, with percentages changing over time in 
increments of 30 days (Figure 5)
•	 Daily risk for transmission of Ebola by patient category 
(Table 1)
•	 Addition of imported cases (Table 2)
For both the Sierra Leone and Liberian data, these three 
numbers were altered until the estimates of cases for either 
Sierra Leone or Liberia produced by the model fit the reported 
TABLE 3. Assumptions about the likelihood of being hospitalized 
with and duration of hospital stay for Ebola, by category of patient 
— EbolaResponse modeling tool, West Africa, 2014
Patient category*
Likelihood 
of being 
hospitalized
Hospital stay 
(days)
Hospitalized, effective prevention/control 1 12
Home or in a community setting such that 
there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission (including safe burial 
when needed)†
0.5 7
Home no effective isolation† 0.3 4
Source: Data adapted from Borchert M, Mutyaba I, Van Kerkhove MD, et al. Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever outbreak in Masindi District, Uganda: outbreak description 
and lessons learned. BMC Infect Dis 2011;11:357.
* Patient category defines the risk for onward transmission of Ebola.
† A proportion of patients in this category was assumed to eventually go to the 
hospital. However, they were assumed to go so late in the progression of the 
disease that the average risk for onward transmission was unchanged.
TABLE 4. Calculation of correction factor to adjust for potential 
underreporting of Ebola cases: comparison between model estimates 
and expert opinion estimates of number of beds in use — 
EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia, 2014 
Country
Uncorrected 
model (no.)
Corrected 
model (no.)
Beds in use, 
expert 
opinion (no.)*
Correction 
factor†Cases
Beds in 
use Cases
Beds in 
use
Liberia 1,552 143 3,915 367 320 2.5
* Obtained from known existing and functioning Ebola treatment units. Some 
patients might have been turned away from certain Ebola treatment units; this 
number is unknown.
† Calculated based on differences in estimated uncorrected number of beds in 
use and expert opinion number of beds in use as of August 28, 2014.
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cases to date (Table 5, Figure 6) (12).  Visual inspection was 
used to validate the fit of the model-predicted cases to the 
actual reported cases (Figure 6).
Interventions 
Controlling the Epidemic
The EbolaResponse modeling tool was used to construct a 
scenario to illustrate how control and prevention interventions 
can slow and eventually stop the Ebola epidemic in Liberia. 
Control is achieved by moving patients who are being attended 
to at home with no effective isolation to either the hospitalized 
category or at home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial 
when needed) category (see also Distribution Over Time of 
Patients by Patient Category). The more patients who are 
hospitalized or being attended to at home or in a community 
setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission, 
the slower the progress of the epidemic because these two 
categories are calculated to have transmission rates of fewer 
than one person infected per infectious person (Table 1). The 
interventions affect the cumulative numbers of cases of Ebola 
and daily beds in use (Figure 3, Figure 7).
Methods
Applying Interventions and Distribution of 
Patients into Categories 
As described previously, in the EbolaResponse modeling 
tool, Ebola patients are categorized by three levels that result 
in different levels of isolation: 1) hospitalized, 2) home or in a 
community setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease 
transmission (including safe burial when needed), and 3) home 
with no effective isolation. These three categories affect the 
risk for onward Ebola virus transmission; the highest risk 
for transmission occurs among patients who are in the third 
category (Table 1). In the absence of a universal preventive 
intervention (e.g., vaccine), control of the epidemic consists of 
having as many patients as possible in either the hospitalized 
category or at home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk for disease transmission category.
To illustrate how increasing the percentage of patients 
in these two categories can control and eventually end the 
epidemic in Liberia, the following circumstances were assumed. 
Starting on August 24, 2014 (day 151 in the model), the 
percentage of patients hospitalized in ETUs was assumed to 
increase from 10% of all patients to 17%. In the subsequent 
30 days (starting September 21, 2014), the percentage was 
increased to 25% and stayed at that level for the remainder of 
TABLE 5. Comparison of reported and model-predicted number of 
Ebola cases*— EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, 2014
Country Reported cases (no.)† Predicted cases (no.)
Liberia 1,550 1,552
Sierra Leone 1,117 1,112
* As of August 28, 2014.
† Source: World Health Organization.
FIGURE 6. Goodness of fit: comparison of cumulative reported and model-predicted numbers of Ebola cases* — EbolaResponse modeling 
tool, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014
* Model-predicted number of cases, obtained by altering the percentage of patients in each of the three categories of patient (Figure 5), risk for transmission of Ebola 
by category of patient (Table 1), and addition of imported cases (Table 2) until the estimates produced by the model for either Sierra Leone or Liberia closely matched 
(fit) the reported cases to date from the World Health Organization.
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Cost of Delay
To illustrate the cost of delay, in terms of additional cases 
and the resulting need for additional resources to end the 
epidemic, in starting to increase interventions that can control 
and eventually stop the epidemic, a separate control-and-
stop scenario was first constructed as follows. Starting on 
the simulation (Figure 8). In addition, starting on August 24, 
2014, the percentage of patients at home or in a community 
setting such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission 
(including safe burial when needed) was increased from 8% 
of all patients to 20%. This percentage was increased to 30% 
for the following 30 days (starting September 21, 2014). This 
percentage was then increased to 35% for the 30 days starting 
October 23, 2015, followed by increases to 40% and 45% on 
November 22, 2014, and December 22, 2014, respectively 
(Figure 7).
With the described increases of patients, by December 22, 
2014, a total of 70% of patients (25% hospitalized in ETUs 
and 45% at home or in a community setting such that there is 
a reduced risk for disease transmission) are estimated to be in 
the two categories that are known to reduce Ebola transmission.
Fitting the Model and Goodness of Fit
As described previously, to estimate the potential impact of 
interventions, the input values of the distribution of patients, 
the risk for onward transmission, and the number of imported 
cases or cases with no known contacts were altered in the 
EbolaResponse modeling tool. The interventions are assumed 
to start after the date of the last reported case. Therefore, the 
input values for imported cases are the same as those shown for 
Liberia (both uncorrected and corrected) (Table 2). Similarly, 
the same values were used for the daily risk for transmission 
(Table 1). Because the interventions start after the date of 
the last reported case, the originally calculated input values 
(Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3) and the resulting goodness of 
fit for the Liberian data (Table 5 and Figure 6) are all valid for 
the intervention scenario.
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
3/26 4/25 5/25 6/24 7/24 8/23 9/22 10/22 11/21 12/21 1/20
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
no
. o
f c
as
es
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
Date
No intervention
Intervention
Uncorrected
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
3/26 4/25 5/25 6/24 7/24 8/23 9/22 10/22 11/21 12/21 1/20
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
no
. o
f c
as
es
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
Date
No intervention
Intervention
Corrected
FIGURE 7. Estimated impact of interventions on cumulative number of Ebola cases, with and without corrected data*— EbolaResponse 
modeling tool, Liberia, 2014
* Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a factor of 2.5 (Table 4).
* Distribution through August 24, 2014, (day 151) estimated using the modeling 
tool, obtained after fitting the model output (cumulative number of cases) to 
actual data. Distributions after that date are based on estimates determined from 
the scenario to illustrate how interventions can slow and eventually stop the Ebola 
epidemic in Liberia.
† Patients are distributed in the EbolaResponse modeling tool into one of three 
categories: 1) hospitalized, 2) home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk for disease transmission (including safe burial when needed), 
and 3) home with no effective isolation. These three categories reflect the risk 
for onward Ebola transmission (Table 1). EbolaResponse is programmed to 
make changes in the distribution of patients among the three categories every 
30 days. For Liberia, day 1 is March 3, 2014, and September 22, 2014, is day 180.
FIGURE 8. Estimated impact of interventions by changing proportion 
of patients* with Ebola over time, by category of patient†— 
EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia, 2014
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FIGURE 9.  Estimated impact of delaying intervention* by changing 
proportion of patients with Ebola over time, by category of 
patient†— EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia, 2014
* Intervention: Starting on September 23, 2014, (day 181 in model) and for the 
next 30 days, the percentage of all patients in Ebola treatment units (ETUs) was 
increased from 10% to 13%. This percentage was again increased on October 23, 
2014 (day 211 in model) to 25%, on November 22, 2014 (day 241 in model) to 
40%, and finally on December 22, 2014 (day 271 in model) to 70%. Day 1 in 
model is March 3, 2014. The impact of a delay of starting the increase in 
interventions was then estimated by twice repeating the above scenario but 
setting the start day on either October 23, 2014, or November 22, 2014.
† Patients are distributed in the EbolaResponse modeling tool into one of three 
categories: 1) hospitalized, 2) home or in a community setting such that there 
is a reduced risk fordisease transmission (including safe burial when needed), 
and 3) home without effective isolation. These three categories reflect the risk 
for onward Ebola transmission (Table 1).
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September 23, 2014, and for the next 30 days, the percentage 
of all patients in ETUs was increased from 10% to 13%. This 
percentage was again increased on October 23, 2014, to 25%, 
on November 22, 2014, to 40%, and finally on December 22, 
2014, to 70% (Figure 9) (i.e., it takes 90 days for the percentage 
of patients in ETUs to reach 70% of all patients). The 
percentage of patients at home or in a community setting 
such that there is a reduced risk for disease transmission was 
kept at 8% from September 23, 2014, through the remainder 
of the period covered by the model. The impact of delay of 
starting the increase in interventions was then estimated by 
twice repeating the above scenario but setting the start day on 
either October 23, 2014, or November 22, 2014.
Starting an intervention on September 23, 2014, such that 
initially the percentage of all patients in ETUs are increased 
from 10% to 13% and thereafter including continual increases 
until 70% of all patients are in an ETU by December 22, 2014, 
results in a peak of 1,335 daily cases (3,408 cases estimated 
using corrected data) and <300 daily cases by January 20, 
2015 (Figure 10).  Delaying the start of the intervention, until 
October 23, 2014, results in the peak increasing to 4,178 daily 
cases (10,646 cases estimated using corrected data).  Delaying 
the start further, until November 22, results in 10,184 daily 
cases (25,847 estimated using corrected data) by January 20, 
2015, which is the last date included in the model (Figure 10).
FIGURE 10. Estimated impact of delaying intervention* on daily number of Ebola cases, with and without correction for underreporting† —
EbolaResponse modeling tool, Liberia, 2014–2015
* Intervention: Starting on September 23, 2014 (day 181 in model), and for the next 30 days, the percentage of all patients in Ebola treatment units was increased 
from 10% to 13%. This percentage was again increased on October 23, 2014 (day 211 in model) to 25%, on November 22, 2014 (day 241 in model) to 40%, and finally 
on December 22, 2014 (day 271 in model) to 70%. Day 1 in model is March 3, 2014. The impact of a delay of starting the increase in interventions was then estimated 
by twice repeating the above scenario but setting the start day on either October 23, 2014, or November 22, 2014.
† Corrected for potential underreporting by multiplying reported cases by a factor of 2.5 (Table 4).
§ New Ebola patients at peak of each start date. (Note that when the intervention is started on November 22, 2014, the peak is not reached by January 20, 2014, which 
is the last date included in the model.)
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